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While at an earlier time there may have been good
reason for the dichotomy of legal maxims inherent in the
majority view,22 there seems no compelling reason in principle why equity should not now afford a complete remedy
for every wrong of which it takes cognizance. Certainly
convenience would be aided by such an approach. Even
more important is the fact that justice would be better
served if equity afforded complete relief rather than forever partially denying to the complainant the full relief to
which he would have been entitled at law. Justice sometimes necessarily involves a penalty. It seems logical and
proper that the principle against penalties should yield to
the principle of doing complete justice in equity, where
equity jurisdiction exists and when a penalty is called for
and permitted by law.
GERALD

J. ROBINSON

Estoppel By Deed Application Against
A Tenant By The Entirety
Columbian Carbon Company v. Kight'
Appellant, the Columbian Carbon Company, a Delaware
Corporation, filed a bill of complaint in the Circuit Court
of Garrett County against the appellees, Edward G. Kight
and wife, Evelyn Kight Warsaw, divorced wife of Pierce
H. Warsaw, and Ray Kight, to obtain a decree declaring
that an oil and gas lease of a tract of land, which was
executed by a husband alone during coverture and which
pertained to land held with the wife by the entireties, be
valid and enforceable as to husband's interest after divorce.
The bill alleged in substance that Pierce H. Warsaw and
his wife, Evelyn Kight Warsaw, acquired the land in question in 1946 as tenants by the entireties. On February 24,
1953, Warsaw alone executed a lease to the appellant wherein he warranted generally his title to the land, expressly
agreeing to defend the title, and covenanted that appellant
should have quiet possession of the land. The lease was
duly recorded on March 6, 1953. On June 22, 1953, the Warsaws were divorced. In December of 1953, Warsaw and his
divorced wife conveyed the land to Edward G. Kight; and
2 Mid Continent Petroleum Corp. v. Bettis, 180 Okla. 193, 69 P. 2d 346,
348 (1937). ". . . the basis of the rule seems to be that, historically, the
assessing of damages is not a function of a court of equity, and it will assess
actual damages only as ancillary to equitable relief."

1207 Md. 203, 114 A. 2d 28 (1955).
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in January, 1954, Edward G. Kight and his wife conveyed
one-half interest in the land to the aforesaid Evelyn Kight
Warsaw. In July, 1954, Edward G. Kight and wife and
Evelyn Kight Warsaw leased the land to Ray Kight. The
lower court sustained a demurrer filed by the appellees on
the ground that the lease executed by Warsaw alone was
void. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
lower court and held that where a lease of real estate is
made by a person who has no present assignable interest
therein, but who acquires an assignableinterest during the
term, the lease by the doctrine of estoppel inures to the
benefit of the lessee by operation of law.
This case with its peculiar facts warrants a discussion
of the nature and origin of the doctrine of estoppel by deed.
The modern doctrine of estoppel is an outgrowth of the
common law doctrine of warranty which originated under
the feudal system.2 By that system an overlord was bound
to protect and defend the fee which his vassal had derived
from him; and in case he failed to do so and the vassal was
evicted because of a superior title, the overlord was under
an implied obligation to give him another feud of equal
value. This implied obligation was known as the doctrine
of warranty. This same obligation is now imposed where
a common law conveyance is accompanied by a covenant of
warranty.' If one without title purports to convey a designated estate, the title that he subsequently acquires will
inure to the benefit of his grantee without the need of
judicial aid in order to prevent circuity of action.
The principle of estoppel based on warranties has long
been followed in Maryland. As far back as 1856, the Court
of Appeals held that:
"... a grantor is estopped from denying the title of
his grantee; a title acquired by the grantor, after he has
conveyed, by warranty, land to which he had no title,
enures to the grantee by estoppel."4
Dictum in the present case" elaborated the principle by
declaring that a title acquired by a grantor subsequent to a
conveyance normally inures by estoppel to the benefit of
his grantee by operation of law, although the deed does not
contain any covenant of warranty. Since the Maryland
Doe d. Potts v. Dowdall, 3 Houst., (Del.) 369, 11 Am. Rep. 757 (1873).
Armour Realty Co. v. Carboy, 124 N. J. L. 205, 11 A. 2d 243 (1940);
Donohue v. Vosper, 189 Mich. 78, 155 N. W. 407 (1915) ; Breen v. Morehead,
126 S.W. 650 (Tex. Civ. App., 1910).
4 Funk v. Newcomer, 10 Md. 301, 316 (1856).
Supra, n. 1, 210.
S
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courts recognize that title actually passes to the grantee
without court action and without delay, it would logically
follow that the obligation of estoppel binds not only the
grantor in such a case but his heirs and assigns. It can be
said that the estoppel adheres to the land and is transmitted
with the estate, whether the same passes by descent or
purchase. And the estoppel becomes, and forever after remains, a muniment of the title so acquired; and when the
party so estopped conveys it, his grantee takes it subject to
such estoppel.
Maryland stands with the majority of the jurisdictions
in saying that title passes to the grantee without judicial
aid and without delay. In a minority of the jurisdictions the
cases indicate that it does not pass automatically, though
the grantor will personally be estopped to deny that it has
passed, and title can be quieted as against him.' But what
of the majority rule - if title automatically passes by estoppel, is the doctrine of estoppel really equitable? Suppose
O owned Blackacre, vacant land. A conveyed Blackacre to
B, a bona fide purchaser. B, believing A owned the land,
accepted and recorded the deed. Subsequently 0 conveyed
Blackacre to A. A recorded his deed. A then conveyed to
C, a bona fide purchaser. C accepted and recorded his deed
without actual knowledge of B's prior deed. B claims under
estoppel by deed; C claims under a clear record title. Should
priority of title be given to B, who from his negligent failure
to examine the records has purchased Blackacre from A
having no title, over that of C, who without negligence, in
good faith, for value, and in reliance upon the chain of title
has purchased after A has acquired the record title from 0?
The leading case which recognized this problem is
Wheeler v. Young,7 a Connecticut case. In that case, the
court said:
"The doctrine of estoppel is one which, when properly applied, 'concludes the truth in order to prevent
fraud and falsehood, and imposes silence on a party,
only when, in conscience and honesty, he should not be
allowed to speak' .....'As understood and applied in
modern times, there is nothing harsh or unjust in the
law of estoppel. It cannot be used but to subserve the
cause of justice and right.'.... 'To allow a title to pass
by conveyance executed and recorded before it is acquired may therefore be a surprise on subsequent purchasers, against which it is not in their power to guard,
03 AMF1RTCA1N LAW OF PRoPERTY (1952), Sec. 15.21, 847; 25 A. L. R.83.
Conn. 44, 55 A. 670 (1903).

7 76

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XVI

and is contrary to the equity which is the chief aim of
the doctrine of estoppel as molded by the liberality of
the modern times'."'
The court further stated:
"It may be said that such estoppel by deed is not an
equitable doctrine, but is a rule of the common law,
based upon the recitals or covenants of the deed. We
reply that as a rule of law it has been so far modified
by the registry laws as to be no longer applicable to
cases where its enforcement would work such an injustice as to give priority to the title of one who negligently failed to examine the records before purchasing
of a grantor having no title, or who purchased at the
risk that his grantor might thereafter acquire title
over that of a subsequent purchaser in good faith, and
in reliance upon the title as it appeared of record. 'The
whole system of registering deeds of land would become of no value if a purchaser could not rely upon the
records as he finds them'."9
Several other jurisdictions have followed the doctrine
laid down in the Wheeler case.' ° The cases" in those jurisdictions indicate that a purchaser of land is not required
to examine the records for prior conveyances executed .and
recorded by his grantor prior to the time the latter acquired
the record title, and that such purchaser is not, therefore,
charged with notice of the record of such a prior deed or
mortgage. In tracing the logic and reasoning in these decisions, it seems to be an inescapable conclusion that these
jurisdictions rely mainly upon the alphabetical index system, which is incorporated in their registry laws. The same
situation arises in the State of Maryland, for Section 67 of
Article 17 in Flack's 1951 Annotated Code provides that
the official land record index for all record offices in Maryland shall be the alphabetical index. However; the public
local laws of Baltimore City provide an additional index
commonly known as the "Block Index" or "Geographical
Index" for the purpose of aiding one searching title in that
city. 2 Under this type of index all conveyances affecting
8Ibid, 672.
I1bid.
1l Ibid.
Breen v. Morehead, 104 Tex. 254, 136 S. W. 1047 (1911) ; Richardson
v. Atlantic Coast Lumber Corporation, 93 S. C. 254, 75 S. E. 371 (1912);
Anderson v. Farmer, 189 S. W. 508 (Tex. Civ. App., 1916).
' Charter and Public Local Laws of Baltimore City, Sec. 995, et seq.
(1938).
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the same tract of land are indexed together irrespective of
the name of the grantor, so that in searching the index one
automatically covers any conveyance executed and recorded prior to the date at which the grantor acquired the
record title. Such a type of index greatly relieves the burden placed upon the examiner in searching the records at
large, and consequently the recognition of the doctrine of
estoppel by deed as a hard and fast rule of law, applicable
against a subsequent purchaser from the common grantor,
would not lead to an inequitable result in Baltimore City.
Upon a close examination of the facts in the instant case,
it becomes evident that the rule laid down in those cases
following the Wheeler case" would not apply. The appellant's lease was recorded and it was in the appellees' chain
of title. Warsaw did have an interest of record in the land
when he executed the lease to the appellant, but it was
non-assignable, because when a husband and wife own an
estate by the entireties, each is entitled to the whole estate
by reason of their legal unity, but neither can convey any
interest without the assent of the other. 14 When the appellees acquired their conveyance, a careful examination of
their chain of title would have disclosed the conveyance to
the appellant which was executed and recorded subsequent
to the time at which the deed to Warsaw and his wife was
recorded.
The instant case should be distinguished from those
Maryland cases 5 that treat the conveyance of the grantor
as a contract to convey, enforceable by an action for specific
performance upon the grantor's subsequent acquisition of
title. In those cases the present consideration paid to the
grantor at the time of the execution of the deed permitted
equity to decree specific performance without relying upon
the doctrine of estoppel by deed, while in the instant case
no present consideration was paid by appellant for the lease.
Also if a deed purports to convey merely the grantor's interest in property, as distinguished from a designated estate,
the doctrine of estoppel will not apply. 6 In other words, an
after-acquired title will not inure to the benefit of a grantee
under a deed which merely purports to release or quit
claim the grantor's then existing interest in the land. Like's Supra, n.

7.

1 McCubbin v. Stanford, 85 Md. 378, 390, 37 A. 214 (1897) ; Tizer v. Tizer,
162 Md. 489, 496, 160 A. 163, is8. op., 161 A. 510 (1932).

Schapiro v. Howard, 113 Md. 360, 78 A. 58 (1910) ; Keys v. Keys, 148
Md. 397, 129 A. 504 (1925) ; Bishop v. Horney, 177 Md. 353, 9 A. 2d 597
(1939).
16 Schapiro v. Howard, Bishop v. Horney, both ibid.
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wise, the doctrine will not apply if a deed purports to convey or transfer a possibility of acquiring property; but the
transfer may be enforced as a contract to convey by the
transferee and all persons claiming through him, provided
a present consideration had been paid. 7
GEiAl

WM. WITTsTADr

Recent Decisions
Adverse Possession - Grantor Remaining In Possession
By Mistake Of Boundary Location Is Not Hostile. Vlachos
v. Witherow, 118 A. 2d 174 (Pa. 1955). In an ejectment
action, defendants claimed title by adverse possession. The
common owner of both parcels involved conveyed one to his
daughter (predecessor in title to plaintiffs) in 1927, but remained in possession of that portion adjoining the land he
retained and separated from the rest of the conveyed land
by a fence. He was not aware at the time that he had conveyed any land on his side of the fence. In 1931 he devised
to his son for life, remainder to his son's children (defendants herein), both the land to which he held title and the
portion mistakenly included in the deed to his daughter, of
which he retained possession. The daughter died in 1936 and
it was not until 1948 that anyone discovered that she had
been deeded the disputed portion, the possession of which
by father, son, and defendants was continuous, actual, and
exclusive until the filing of ejectment in 1952. On appeal
from a verdict directed for plaintiffs, held, affirmed. Hostility of possession is an essential element to adverse possession, and when the area of actual possession of the title
holder is restricted by a mistaken belief as to the location
of the boundary, and the possession of the adverse party is
likewise extended as a result of the same mistake, that
hostility is abent. Where the grantor continues in possession, his possession is considered that of the grantee until
some unequivocally hostile act occurs which, being brought
home to the grantee, will support an adverse claim. Here,
the devise of the disputed portion to the son and defendants
was not such an act.
While the Court of Appeals has never decided a case
in which the claim of adverse possession depended upon
17

Keys v. Keys, 8upra, n. 15.

